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Although US citizens generally oppose the legal recognition of same-sex marriages more than 
civil unions, the reasons for this opposition remain unclear. In two experiments, we presented 
participants with one of two hypothetical state laws legally recognizing same-sex partnerships. 
The laws differed only in the label applied to those partnerships (i.e. civil union or marriage). 
Across both studies, participants expressed less support for same-sex marriages relative to civil 
unions. In addition, participants considering the marriage law found it more threatening to 
heterosexuals’ rights and social status than did those reading the civil union law, and this threat 
partially mediated the effect of the relationship label on support for the law. Thus, consistent 
with social identity theory, opposition to the same-sex marriage label is, in part, due to 
perceived threats to heterosexual identity. 
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…the dissimilitude between the terms ‘civil marriage’ 
and ‘civil union’ is not innocuous; it is a considered 
choice of language that refl ects a demonstrable 
assigning of same-sex, largely homosexual, couples 
to second-class status. Goodridge v. Dept. of Public 
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003)
In recent years, same-sex couples have taken 
great strides toward achieving social equality. 
Since 2001, same-sex couples have obtained 
full marriage rights in five countries—The 
Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, Spain, and 
South Africa. In all of these countries, marriage 
is defi ned legally in gender-neutral terms—
same-sex marriages and different-sex marriages 
are both considered simply as ‘marriages’ with no 
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differentiation. Starting with Denmark in 1989, 
20 countries have adopted legally recognized 
same-sex ‘civil unions’ or ‘domestic partner-
ships’. In some countries the rights granted 
in these partnerships are virtually identical to 
marriage, but in many cases they offer only a 
portion of rights typically afforded to married 
couples. Regardless of the degree to which they 
fall short of equality for same- and different-sex 
couples, these partnerships are legally separate 
from marriage and go by a different name.
Legally sanctioned same-sex partnerships 
remain a controversial issue. In the US, many 
efforts to extend the rights of same-sex partners 
have met with fi erce resistance from the political 
elite. In this article we consider one important 
aspect of the same-sex relationship debate: 
how does the label applied to same-sex partner-
ships affect support for their legality? That is, 
does support for these relationships depend on 
whether they are referred to as ‘civil unions’ or 
‘marriages’?
Public opinion data fi nd that US citizens are 
more supportive of civil unions than same sex-
marriages (Cauchon, 2004). However, such 
research typically confounds the relationship 
label with the amount of rights granted to the 
partners involved. Thus, we do not know the 
extent to which the relationship label itself, 
independent of the rights granted to same-
sex couples, affects support for recognition of 
same-sex partnerships. Indeed, we suggest that 
attending to the symbolic implications of the 
relationship label, not only the expansion of 
rights, is critical to understanding support for the 
recognition of same-sex relationships. Following 
a social identity approach (Tajfel & Turner, 
1986), we suggest that the degree to which a 
relationship label is perceived as threatening to 
the collective identity of heterosexuals should 
affect support for its legality.
Support for same-sex civil unions 
and marriages in the US
In the US, recent public opinion polls indicate 
greater support for same-sex civil unions than 
marriages (Brewer & Wilcox, 2005). For instance, 
results of a national 2004 Gallup poll suggest 
weak support for same-sex marriages (33%), 
but relatively stronger support for civil unions 
(54%; Cauchon, 2004). Similarly, a number of 
politicians have expressed a preference for civil 
unions by supporting legislation that would 
prohibit same-sex marriages, but would not 
necessarily preclude the possibility of recog-
nizing these relationships under another name 
(e.g. 2004 Presidential candidate John Kerry; 
Farhi, 2004). For example, when asked about 
legal recognition of same-sex partnerships, 
Connecticut Governor Jodi Rell said, ‘I don’t 
have any trouble with the concept … If we can 
address those concerns without marriage, then 
I am open to the concept’ (emphasis added; 
Yardley, 2005).
Although it seems clear that ‘civil unions’ cur-
rently receive greater support than ‘marriages’ 
in the US, research has yet to examine the 
psychological underpinnings of this preference. 
Certainly, opposition may stem from people per-
ceiving (with some accuracy) that the recognition 
of gender-neutral marriages grants more legal 
rights and protection to gay, lesbian, bisexual, 
or transgender people than the recognition of 
civil unions, as civil unions typically provide 
only a subset of the benefi ts that different-sex 
marriages provide. In the United States, Maine, 
Hawaii, the District of Columbia, and Washington 
have created legal unions for same-sex couples 
that offer only a subset of the rights of marriage. 
Therefore, the relative opposition to same-sex 
marriage may partially refl ect a heterosexist op-
position to the greater rights it could provide 
to same-sex partnerships. 
Public opinion research does not rule out this 
explanation, as this research does not control for 
inferences about the strength of the law based on 
the relationship label. Thus, existing data does 
not offer much evidence as to the effect of the 
relationship label independent of inferences 
about the rights granted to same-sex couples. 
In the present study we consider the intriguing 
possibility that the relative lack of support for 
marriage might also be due to its symbolic 
implications, independent of its increased legal 
protections. Interestingly, Connecticut, Vermont, 
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New Jersey, and California have created legal 
same-sex unions that are explicitly defi ned as 
providing equal access to all the rights and 
responsibilities of marriage, but have chosen 
to label these ‘unions’ as something other than 
marriage. In the US, only Massachusetts recog-
nizes gender-neutral marriage.
We adopt a social identity approach (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986) to addressing this issue and posit 
that the marriage label threatens the identities 
of heterosexuals more than the civil union label. 
That is, we suggest that weaker support for same-
sex marriage laws, relative to civil unions laws, 
is partially due to increased perceptions of a 
threat to the heterosexual ingroup posed by the 
marriage label, and the motivation to protect 
that group identity. 
Social identity and same-sex 
relationships
According to social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel 
& Turner, 1986) people’s social category mem-
berships constitute important aspects of self-
defi nition. Further, SIT assumes that people 
are motivated to perceive valued ingroups as 
positively distinct from relevant outgroups. One 
of SIT’s central contributions is the notion that 
ingroup status is not a function of the absolute 
prestige, resources, or power enjoyed by the high 
status group, but is a relative judgment based 
on comparisons between the ingroup and other 
groups that are salient or relevant in context. In 
other words, the status of outgroups has impli-
cations for the ingroup identity. Thus, individuals 
who perceive an outgroup threat to the positive 
distinctiveness of a valued ingroup identity will 
take advantage of opportunities to protect their 
ingroup’s distinctiveness (for a review see Jetten, 
Spears, & Postmes, 2004). For members of high 
status groups who perceive their higher status 
as legitimate, attempts by lower status groups 
to improve their status are likely to be met 
with social competition, or deliberate attempts to 
maintain the status boundaries between groups 
(Abrams, Carter, & Hogg, 1989; Branscombe, 
Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Turner & 
Brown, 1978). 
Following this line of reasoning, heterosexual 
people are likely to experience the legal recog-
nition of same-sex partnerships as a threat to 
their social identity. This threat should arise 
because legally sanctioned same-sex relationships 
serve to decrease the status difference between 
heterosexuals and homosexuals, as homosexuals 
stand to gain rights that they did not previously 
have. Thus, despite having no implications for 
the rights granted to heterosexual couples in 
an absolute sense, extending rights to same-sex 
couples threatens the relative status advantage 
enjoyed by heterosexuals. Overall, heterosexuals 
appear to feel entitled to their higher status pos-
ition, expressing relatively negative attitudes 
toward homosexuals (e.g. Kite & Whitley, 1996) 
and stigmatizing them as abnormal or immoral 
(e.g. Pew Research Center, 2003). Thus, when 
same-sex relationships are offered the same 
legal recognition that different-sex relationships 
currently receive, heterosexual people are likely 
to resist this threat to their privileged identity. 
By threatening the relatively advantaged status 
of heterosexuals, both same-sex marriages and 
civil unions represent a threat to heterosexual 
group identity (even though they have no effect 
on the ‘absolute’ status of heterosexual people). 
However, we propose that same-sex marriages 
represent a greater threat to the positive distinct-
iveness of heterosexual identity, even if only on a 
symbolic level. By describing both same-sex and 
different-sex partnerships with the same term, 
the marriage label implies that the different types 
of relationships are similar and undermines 
the distinctiveness of the heterosexual group 
identity. In contrast, even if identical rights are 
granted to same-sex couples through civil union 
legislation, heterosexual people can maintain 
some sense of positive distinctiveness by creating 
a separate label for same-sex relationships, and 
keeping the more traditional and valued term 
for themselves. Thus, assuming that heterosexual 
people are invested in their heterosexual group 
identity, they are more likely to support a law 
recognizing same-sex civil unions over a law 
recognizing same-sex marriages because the 
marriage label represents a greater threat to 
heterosexual identity. 
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The present research
The goal of the present research was to examine 
whether, all else equal, the label applied to same-
sex relationships affects support for their 
legality. Thus, in two experiments we presented 
participants with one of two different versions 
of a hypothetical state law that would legally 
acknowledge same-sex relationships and provide 
same-sex couples with the same rights and pro-
tections that different-sex couples currently 
receive. The only thing that differed between the 
two laws was the label applied: ‘marriage’ versus 
‘civil union’. We then measured participants’ 
support for the law, as well their beliefs about 
various forms of threat that same-sex relationships 
may pose. 
Although our primary interest was in hetero-
sexual threat (in line with SIT), we also examined 
other forms of threat that could serve as plausible 
alternative mediators, such as threats to the insti-
tution of marriage, threats to the functioning of 
society, and threats to ‘the family’. We examined 
these other forms of threat because they are 
reasons people commonly cite for not supporting 
gay marriage (e.g. Pew Research Center, 2003), 
and are clearly evident in public discourse on 
the issue of same-sex marriage. For instance, in 
a 2004 radio address by President George W. 
Bush, he states that, ‘If courts create their own 
arbitrary defi nition of marriage … the institution 
is weakened’. Moreover, he refers to marriage as 
‘the basis of an orderly society’ and states that 
‘changing the defi nition of traditional marriage 
will undermine the family structure’ (Longley, 
2004). The implication of these comments is that 
same-sex marriage threatens society, families, 
and the institution of marriage itself. A similar 
case for these forms of threat could be drawn 
from current social psychological theorizing 
on values and prejudice. That is, several studies 
have demonstrated that a belief that gays and 
lesbians violate family values is associated with 
anti-gay prejudice (e.g. Haddock & Zanna, 1998; 
Vescio & Biernat, 2003). Thus, such studies would 
seem to suggest that a threat to values, particularly 
family values, would affect support for recognition 
of same-sex relationships.
Hypotheses
We predicted an effect of the relationship label 
such that same-sex civil unions would receive 
stronger support than same-sex marriages 
(Hypothesis 1). Additionally, we predicted that 
the same-sex marriage law would be perceived as 
more threatening to heterosexuals than the civil 
union law (Hy-pothesis 2). Lastly, we predicted 
that perceptions of heterosexual threat would 
mediate the association between relationship 
label and support for the law (Hypothesis 3). 
We did not advance specifi c hypotheses regard-
ing the other types of threat assessed (i.e. threat 
to society, family values, and the institution of 
marriage), but included them for two reasons. 
First, these threats are representative of the 
content of public discourse opposing same-sex 
marriage. Second, these forms of threat could 
serve as potential alternative mediators of the 
hypothesized effect of the label on support for 
the law. 
Experiment 1
We conducted Experiment 1 as a general test 
of the above hypotheses. When examining the 
effect of experimental condition, we controlled 
for participants’ levels of anti-gay prejudice. Par-
ticipants with negative attitudes toward gay and 
lesbian people are likely to be more opposed to 
both civil unions and same-sex marriages than 
less prejudiced participants because both types 
of partnerships expand the rights of people in 
homosexual relationships. Because our goal 
was to examine the differential support for 
civil unions and marriages due to the label used, 
rather than the expansion of rights, we chose to 
partial out a source of variance common to both 
types of relationships. Additionally, controlling 
for variance in anti-gay prejudice, a variable we 
assumed would affect support for both types 
of partnerships, increases statistical power to 
detect the effects of a rather subtle manipulation 
(Frigon & Laurencelle, 1993). 
Method
Participants Participants were heterosexual 
psychology students at a university in Indiana 
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(N = 115; 67 males, 48 females) who chose to 
participate in this study for credit in a general 
psychology course. Students signed up for par-
ticipation through an internet site where this 
study was listed among many others. The sam-
ple was predominately European American 
(86.1%), with few participants indicating that 
they were African American (2.6%), Asian 
American (7.0%), or Hispanic American (2.6%). 
On average, participants were 19 years old 
(SD = 1.30).
Materials and procedure Working independ-
ently, participants completed the study in small 
groups. After receiving informed consent, we 
presented participants with a hypothetical 
Indiana state law that would allow for legal 
recognition of same-sex relationships and 
provide same-sex partners with all of the same 
rights and protections that different-sex mar-
ried partners currently receive. Participants re-
ceived one of two different versions of the law 
(see appendix). The two laws differed only 
in the specifi c label applied to the relation-
ship: ‘civil union’ versus ‘marriage’. The rest of 
the information was virtually identical (the only 
exception being that the couple members were 
referred to as ‘spouses’ under the marriage law 
and ‘partners’ under the civil union law) and 
informed participants of various rights and 
benefi ts that would be afforded to same-sex 
couples under the new law. 
In reality, the Indiana state legislature has been 
far less accepting of same-sex relationships than 
the laws read by participants. In 1997, Indiana 
legislators passed a law banning gay marriage 
(Indiana Code 31-11-1-1). In 2005, Indiana 
legislators passed an amendment to the state’s 
Constitution barring same-sex couples from 
marriage and similar legal structures such as civil 
unions. To become law, the amendment would 
have to be approved again in the 2007–2008 
legislative session and then by Indiana voters. 
Across the US, 26 states have passed constitutional 
amendments banning same-sex marriage, and 
43 have laws that defi ne marriage as ‘between 
a man and a woman’.
Although the two experimental conditions 
specifi ed laws that were identical in the rights 
they granted, it is still possible that participants 
would infer that the marriage law had greater 
consequences for the rights of same-sex couples 
than the civil union law. To ensure that any effects 
of the manipulation were due to the label itself 
and not differential perceptions of the amount 
of rights granted, we included a measure of 
the extent to which the laws were perceived as 
granting equal rights to same-sex partners. After 
reading about the law, participants responded to 
the question ‘How much will this law expand the 
rights of homosexuals?’ on a scale ranging from 
‘will not expand homosexual rights at all’ (1) to 
‘will expand homosexual rights greatly’ (7). 
Participants then completed the dependent 
measures in the order described below. Unless 
otherwise noted, participants responded to 
questionnaire items using a 7-point scale. For 
most scales, the endpoints ranged from strongly 
disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). However, where 
appropriate, the endpoints differed to refl ect the 
content of the statement (e.g. very negative to very 
positive). Overall scores for the measures were 
obtained by reverse-scoring where appropriate 
and averaging the individual item scores. After 
completing all questionnaires, participants were 
fully debriefed.
Support for the law Participants rated their sup-
port for the law by indicating their agreement 
or disagreement with the following statements: 
‘I am in support of this law’, ‘I would be willing 
to vote for legislators who supported this law’, 
and ‘Overall, how do you feel about this law?’ 
(α = .97). 
Perceived threat Participants rated the extent to 
which the laws present a threat to society (‘This law 
would create societal problems’, ‘This law would 
be good for society’, and ‘This law threatens the 
very fabric of society’; α = .86), heterosexuals (‘This 
law threatens heterosexual rights’, ‘Does this 
law threaten the rights of heterosexuals?’, and 
‘Does this law protect or threaten civil rights?’; 
α = .83), family values (‘This law is harmful to 
families and children’, ‘This law is inconsistent 
with family values’, and ‘Does this law protect 
children or harm children?’; α = .89), and the 
institution of marriage (‘I think this law would 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 10(4)
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change the defi nition of marriage in a negative 
way’, ‘I think this law would positively affect 
the institution of marriage’, and ‘Does this law 
harm or strengthen the institution of marriage?’; 
α = .92). We also included items assessing threat 
to participants’ personal relationships (‘I think 
this law might negatively affect any marriage 
I might have now or in the future’, ‘This law 
would be a good thing for romantic relationships 
I might have’, and ‘This law would do no 
harm to me personally’; α = .56). A principal 
components factor analysis of all of the threat 
items yielded a two-factor solution explaining 
68% of the total item variance. All of the items 
assessing threats to society, family values, and 
the institution of marriage as well as one of 
the personal threat items loaded on a single 
factor (all factor loadings > .50). In contrast, 
the heterosexual threat items and two of the 
personal threat items loaded on the other factor 
(all factor loadings > .60). The only item to 
load on more than one factor at a level greater 
than .40 was one of the personal threat items. 
Because the personal threat items did not load 
consistently on one of the factors, it is diffi cult 
to determine their meaning. For that reason, 
and because these personal threat items do not 
clearly map onto threats to heterosexuals as a 
group, we dropped these three items from the 
primary analyses.
Anti-gay prejudice Anti-gay prejudice was assessed 
with Herek’s (1988) Attitudes Toward Lesbians 
and Gay Men Scale (α = .96). Sample items from 
this measure include ‘I think male homosexuals 
are disgusting’ and ‘Lesbians are sick’.
Demographic items Participants also completed 
a standard demographic questionnaire that 
included items assessing sexual orientation, 
gender, age, and ethnicity. The few participants 
who did not indicate that they were heterosexual 
were not included in the analyses.
Results and discussion
Preliminary analyses We fi rst wanted to rule 
out the possibility that participants inferred that 
the marriage law and civil union law differen-
tially extended the rights of same-sex couples. 
Importantly, responses to the question about 
the amount of rights granted were not related 
to experimental condition (F(1, 113) = 1.28, 
p = .261). Participants perceived both the mar-
riage law (M = 6.29, SD = 1.08) and the civil union 
law (M = 6.02, SD = 1.51) as greatly expanding 
the rights of same-sex couples. Therefore, we 
can be reasonably confi dent that any effects 
due to the manipulation were a result of the 
relationship labels and not inferences about the 
amount of rights granted by the laws.
In the analyses that follow, we controlled for 
participants’ levels of anti-gay prejudice. How-
ever, in order to satisfy the assumptions of the 
analysis of covariance approach, the relationship 
between the covariate and dependent variables 
must be independent of condition (Frigon & 
Laurencelle, 1993). Importantly, anti-gay preju-
dice did not differ signifi cantly across conditions 
(F(1, 113) = 0.17, p = .681), nor did it signifi cantly 
interact with experimental condition to predict 
support for the law or any of the measured 
forms of threat. Given the lack of interactions, 
anti-gay prejudice appears to be accounting 
for variance in support for recognizing same-
sex relationships per se, regardless of the label 
applied to those relationships.
Effects of label on support for the law Consistent 
with Hypothesis 1, participants differed in their 
favorability toward the two laws (F(1, 112) = 7.91, 
p = .006) (Eta-squared = .07). Specifi cally, par-
ticipants showed signifi cantly less support for 
the marriage law (M = 3.62, SE = 0.18) than the 
civil union law (M = 4.33, SE = 0.18). Anti-gay 
prejudice was negatively associated with support 
for the law (p < .001) (Eta-squared = .63). 
Perceptions of threat We next examined 
whether the label affected participants’ percep-
tions of threat. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, 
perceptions of heterosexual threat margin-
ally differed across experimental conditions 
(F(1, 112) = 3.50, p = .064) (Eta-squared = .03). 
As shown in Table 1, heterosexual threat tended 
to be higher in the gay marriage condition 
(M = 3.01, SE = 0.15) than the civil union con-
dition (M = 2.61, SE = 0.15). However, the other 
types of threat assessed were not affected by 
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the experimental manipulation. Thus, threats 
to society (F(1, 112) = 2.35, p = .128), family 
values (F(1, 112) = 0.25, p = .618), and the 
institution of marriage did not differ by condition 
(F(1, 112) = 0.91, p = .342), nor did a composite 
measure consisting of all three of these forms 
of threat (F(1, 112) = 1.37, p = .244). In all of 
the above analyses, anti-gay prejudice was a 
signifi cant covariate, being positively related 
to perceptions of threat (p < .001).
Mediational analyses We next examined 
whether perceptions of threat mediated the effect 
of the relationship label on support for the law, 
using procedures outlined by Baron and Kenny 
(1986). The fi rst and second criteria required 
to demonstrate mediation are effects of the 
independent variable on both the dependent 
variable and the mediator. Both of these criteria 
were met for heterosexual threat. Specifi cally, 
experimental condition signifi cantly predicted 
support for the law (the dependent variable; 
B = –.70; t(112) = –2.81, p = .006) and marginally 
predicted heterosexual threat (the hypothesized 
mediator; B = .40; t(112) = 1.87, p = .064). 
To meet the third criterion, the mediator must 
predict the dependent variable controlling for 
the effects of the independent variable. When 
we examined the effect of heterosexual threat on 
support for the law when relationship label was 
simultaneously taken into account, heterosexual 
threat was indeed a signifi cant predictor of 
support for the law (B = –.38; t(111) = –3.58; 
p < .001), such that higher levels of threat were 
associated with less support. Finally, meeting 
the fourth criterion, the effect of relationship 
label on support for the law was reduced when 
controlling for heterosexual threat (B = –.55; 
t(111) = –2.28, p = .024). Results of a Sobel 
test corroborated these fi ndings by indicating 
that the mediated effect was marginally signifi -
cant (z = –1.66, p = .097).1 
In sum, the results of Experiment 1 were sup-
portive of our hypotheses. First, consistent with 
public opinion research, participants preferred 
the civil union law to the marriage law. Second, 
in line with predictions based on social identity 
theory, heterosexual threat partially mediated 
this effect. However, the statistical test for medi-
ation was only marginally signifi cant. Thus, in an 
attempt to provide more defi nitive support for 
our hypotheses, we refi ned our research mater-
ials and conducted a second study.
Experiment 2
The primary limitation of Experiment 1 was that 
the items used to measure heterosexual threat 
were narrowly limited to perceptions of threats 
to heterosexuals’ rights and did not directly ask 
about heterosexual identity per se. Therefore, in 
Experiment 2 we measured the threat to hetero-
sexual group identity more directly, specifi cally in 
terms of the status and identity of heterosexuals 
as a group. Aside from this important change to 
the measurement of our hypothesized mediator, 
Table 1. Experiment 1: Support for the law and threats by experimental condition
 Same-sex marriage law Civil union law
Variable n = 58 n = 57
Support for the law 3.62a (0.18) 4.33b (0.18)
Threat to heterosexuals 3.01a (0.15) 2.61b (0.15)
Threat to society 4.56a (0.14) 4.26a (0.14)
Threat to family values 4.27a (0.15) 4.17a (0.16)
Threat to marriage 4.57a (0.16) 4.36a (0.16)
Threat composite 4.47a (0.12) 4.26a (0.13)
 (society, family, & marriage)
Notes: Differing subscripts indicate within-row signifi cant differences (p < .05 or less), except for threat to 
heterosexuals, where differing subscripts indicate within-row marginally signifi cant differences (p < .07). Values 
in parentheses are standard errors. All values are controlling for anti-gay prejudice. The scales for all measures 
ranged from 1 (strongly disagree/very negative) to 7 (strongly agree/very positive).
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the design and materials were similar to those 
used in Experiment 1. 
Method
Participants Heterosexual undergraduates 
at a university in Indiana (N = 218; 112 males, 
106 females) participated for credit in a gen-
eral psychology course. The sample was pre-
dominately European American (84.4%), with 
few participants indicating that they were African 
American (6.4%), Asian American (5.5%), 
Hispanic American (1.8%), or ‘Other’ (1.8%). 
On average, participants were 19.58 years old 
(SD = 1.42).
Materials and procedure After receiving 
informed consent, we presented participants 
with a manipulation that was identical to that 
used in Experiment 1 (see appendix). Thus, 
participants read either the same-sex marriage 
law or the same-sex civil union law. Again, to 
ensure that any effects of the manipulation were 
due to the label itself and not to differential 
perceptions of the amount of rights granted, 
participants were asked ‘How much will this law 
expand the rights of homosexuals?’ on a scale 
ranging from ‘will not expand homosexual rights 
at all’ (1) to ‘will expand homosexual rights 
greatly’ (7). 
Participants then completed the dependent 
measures in the order described below. As in 
Experiment 1, participants responded to all 
questionnaire items using a 7-point scale. After 
completing all questionnaires, participants were 
fully debriefed.
Support for the law Participants completed the 
same three-item measure of support for the law 
used in Experiment 1 (α = .99). 
Perceived threat Relying on the same items used 
in Experiment 1, participants rated the extent 
to which the laws present a threat to society 
(3 items; α = .87), family values (3 items; α = .87), 
and the institution of marriage (3 items; α = .92). 
Participants also completed a new measure of 
the extent to which the laws threaten heterosexuals 
that focused more on threats to the social status 
of heterosexuals than heterosexuals’ rights 
(‘This law harms the social status of hetero-
sexuals’, ‘This law strips heterosexuals of their 
rightful place in society’, ‘This law threatens 
heterosexuals’, ‘This law is harmful to hetero-
sexuals’; α = .93). Lastly, because the meaning 
of the personal threat items administered in 
Experiment 1 was unclear, they were not included 
in the second study. A principal components 
factor analysis of all of the threat items yielded 
a two-factor solution explaining 77% of the total 
item variance. All of the items assessing threats 
to society, family values, and the institution 
of marriage loaded on one factor (all factor 
loadings > .60), while only the heterosexual 
threat items loaded on the other factor (all factor 
loadings > .80). No items loaded on more than 
one factor at a level greater than .40. 
Other measures Anti-gay prejudice was assessed 
with Herek’s (1988) Attitudes Toward Lesbians 
and Gay Men Scale (α = .97). Additionally, par-
ticipants completed the same demographic items 
administered in Experiment 1.
Results and discussion
Preliminary analyses Responses to the question 
about the amount of rights granted were not 
related to the experimental condition (F(1, 216)= 
1.10, p = .295). As in Experiment 1, participants 
perceived both the marriage law (M = 6.39, 
SD = 1.00) and the civil union law (M = 6.25, 
SD = 0.99) as greatly expanding the rights of 
same-sex couples. Therefore, any effects due 
to the manipulation are likely to be a result 
of the relationship labels themselves and not 
inferences about the amount of rights granted 
by the laws.
In the analyses that follow, we controlled for 
anti-gay prejudice. Anti-gay prejudice was not re-
lated to the experimental condition (F(1, 216) = 
0.03, p = .869). Additionally, as in Experiment 1, 
anti-gay prejudice did not interact with the ex-
perimental condition to predict support for the law 
or any of the relevant forms of threat assessed.2
Effects of label on support for the law Consistent 
with predictions, participants differed in their 
favorability toward the two laws (F(1, 215) = 7.99, 
p = .005) (Eta-squared = .04). Participants were 
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signifi cantly less supportive of the marriage 
law (M = 4.03, SE = 0.09) than the civil union 
law (M = 4.41, SE = 0.09). Anti-gay prejudice 
was a signifi cant covariate and was negatively 
associated with support for the law (p < .001) 
(Eta-squared = .79). 
Perceptions of threat In line with our predic-
tions, perceptions of heterosexual threat differed 
across experimental conditions (F(1, 215) = 6.62, 
p = .011) (Eta-squared = .03). As shown in 
Table 2, heterosexual threat was higher in the 
marriage condition (M = 2.86, SE = 0.10) com-
pared to the civil union condition (M = 2.49, 
SE = 0.10). In contrast, threats to society 
(F(1, 215) = 1.17, p = .280), and family values 
(F(1, 215) = 2.19, p = .140), did not differ by 
condition. However, threat to the institution 
of marriage (F(1, 215) = 3.58, p = .060), and 
a composite measure consisting of the three 
alternate forms of threat were marginally greater 
in the marriage condition relative to the civil 
union condition (F(1, 215) = 3.11, p = .079). As a 
covariate, anti-gay prejudice was positively related 
to all of the measures of threat (p < .001).
 
Mediational analyses Next, we examined 
whether perceptions of threat mediated the 
impact of relationship label on support for the 
law. First, experimental condition signifi cantly 
predicted both support for the law (the dependent 
variable; B = –.38, t(215) = –2.83, p = .005) and 
heterosexual threat (the hypothesized mediator; 
B = .37, t(215) = 2.57, p = .011). 
Second, when we examined the effect of the 
relationship label on support for the law when 
heterosexual threat was simultaneously taken 
into account, heterosexual threat signifi cantly 
predicted support for the law (B = –.36; t(214) = 
–6.21, p < .001), such that higher levels of threat 
were associated with less support. Finally, when 
controlling for heterosexual threat, the effect of 
the relationship label on support for the law 
was reduced (B = –.24; t(214) = –1.94, p = .053). 
Results of a Sobel test corroborated these fi nd-
ings by indicating that the mediation was sig-
nifi cant (z = 2.38, p = .018). Thus, heterosexual 
threat was at least partially responsible for 
participants’ reduced support for the same-sex 
marriage law relative to the civil union law.
Next, because some of the other forms of threat 
assessed differed marginally across conditions, 
we also examined the possibility that these threat 
measures could serve as alternative mediators 
of the observed effect. However, results of Sobel 
tests were only marginally signifi cant for both 
threat to the institution of marriage (z = 1.84, 
p = .066) and the composite threat measure 
(z = 1.75, p = .081). Thus, the evidence obtained 
for heterosexual threat as the mediator appears 
to be more conclusive than that obtained for 
these other forms of threat.3
General discussion
We employed a novel approach to addressing 
the issue of why same-sex civil unions are 
preferred over same-sex marriages. That is, 
Table 2. Experiment 2: Support for the law and threats by experimental condition
 Same-sex marriage law Civil union law
Variable n = 110 n = 108
Support for the law 4.03a (0.09) 4.41b (0.10)
Threat to heterosexuals 2.86a (0.10) 2.49b (0.10)
Threat to society 3.95a (0.09) 3.82a (0.09)
Threat to family values 3.78a (0.10) 3.56a (0.10)
Threat to marriage 4.52a (0.11) 4.24a (0.11)
Threat composite 4.05a (0.08) 3.86a (0.08)
 (society, family, & marriage)
Notes: Differing subscripts indicate within-row signifi cant differences (p < .05 or less). Values in parentheses 
are standard errors. All values are controlling for anti-gay prejudice. The scales for all measures ranged from 1 
(strongly disagree/very negative) to 7 (strongly agree/very positive).
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rather than relying exclusively on survey results 
and correlational data, we conducted two ex-
periments testing a social identity theory explan-
ation for differential support for civil unions and 
marriages. Overall, our hypotheses were sup-
ported. In both studies, support for same-sex 
civil unions was higher than support for same-
sex marriages, mirroring effects found in recent 
public opinion polls (Brewer & Wilcox, 2005). 
This fi nding is particularly important because 
we obtained it even when controlling for the 
amount of rights granted by the laws. Thus, 
this is the fi rst evidence of which we are aware 
indicating that the relationship label itself affects 
support for same-sex relationship legislation, 
independent of the amount of rights granted 
to same-sex partners. 
Importantly, we also found that participants 
presented with the marriage law perceived 
more threat to heterosexuals than participants 
presented with the civil union law. Further, our 
results in both studies indicate that hetero-
sexual threat partially mediated the effect of 
the relationship label on support for the law. 
None of the other forms of threat assessed could 
mediate this association. 
These fi ndings offer support for one of SIT’s 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1986) core contributions—the 
contention that people are motivated to achieve a 
positive social identity vis-a-vis relevant outgroups. 
In terms of absolute rights and privileges, the 
marriage law would not harm heterosexual 
people. Nonetheless, our participants found 
the marriage law more threatening to hetero-
sexuals than the civil union law, because, as 
SIT would suggest, ingroup identity results 
from intergroup comparisons. Compared to 
the civil union law, the marriage law is more 
threatening to the positive distinctiveness of the 
heterosexual group identity by elevating same-sex 
relationships to the same level as different-sex 
ones. Other theoretical perspectives assume that 
threat (Duckitt, 2006) and symbolic aspects of 
intergroup relationships (Kinder & Sears, 1981) 
are important predictors of discrimination 
and intergroup attitudes. However, SIT is 
unique (except where incorporated into other 
perspectives, e.g. Stephan & Stephan, 2000) 
in its assumptions that ingroup identity results 
from and is constructed through intergroup 
comparisons, and that intergroup discrimination 
results not just from attitudes toward the outgroup 
(prejudice) but also from the motivation to pro-
tect ingroup identity.
Our results suggest that the US public may 
be relatively more supportive of same-sex civil 
unions in part because they are less threatening 
to heterosexual identity than same-sex marriages. 
This contention is bolstered by the fi nding that 
none of the other types of threat assessed in this 
study mediated the association between rela-
tionship label and support for the law. SIT may 
therefore prove to be a useful framework for 
understanding people’s support for or opposition 
to recognizing same-sex relationships. Indeed, 
our results suggest that identity concerns do play 
a role in understanding differential support for 
marriage and civil union laws.
Limitations and future directions 
There are multiple strengths of the present study. 
For instance, this is the fi rst study to show that 
the relationship label itself can affect support 
for granting equal rights to same-sex couples. 
Even when controlling for the amount of rights 
granted to same-sex couples, we found that the 
marriage label elicited less support than the civil 
union label. However, it is important to note that 
in the ‘real world’, the rights attached to these 
two labels typically are not equivalent. Thus, 
although they cannot account for the effects 
observed in our studies, perceptions of the 
amount of rights granted could indeed explain 
some of the differential support for marriages 
compared to civil unions. 
Second, this study provides one of the fi rst 
experimental investigations into the issue of why 
same-sex civil unions are preferred over same-
sex marriages. Testing predictions derived from 
SIT, we found evidence for a novel and non-
obvious explanation for the label effect—that the 
marriage label threatens heterosexual identity 
despite posing no threat to heterosexual people 
in absolute terms. Confi dence in our theoretical 
explanation is bolstered by lack of support for 
plausible alternative mediators, as none of the 
other forms of threat were signifi cantly affected 
by the label. Finally, this research addresses an 
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important and controversial issue that is at the 
center of ongoing political debate.
However, there are also a few limitations to this 
work. First, our samples only included under-
graduate college students at a Midwestern uni-
versity. Thus, the extent to which these fi ndings 
might generalize to more diverse samples is a 
question for future research. Along the same 
lines, our results cannot speak to the views of gays 
and lesbians on their preference for different 
labels, which may be an interesting avenue for 
further inquiry. Indeed, some gay men, lesbians, 
and bisexuals may object to legalized same-sex 
partnerships, particularly same-sex marriages, 
to the extent that they view the institution of 
marriage itself as being fundamentally hetero-
sexist (Lannutti, 2005). 
Although we did fi nd some support for our 
hypothesized mediation, heterosexual threat 
did not appear to fully mediate the association 
between relationship label and support for the 
law. Of course, tests for mediation are fairly con-
servative, and mediated relationships may not 
be reliable for a variety of reasons (Haslam & 
McGarty, 1998, p. 259). However, given that we 
did not obtain convincing evidence for mediation 
by other forms of threat, heterosexual threat 
appears to be the most promising explanation 
for differences in support for same-sex marriages 
versus civil unions. An important direction for 
future research, then, is to expand upon the 
measurement of heterosexual threat to further 
examine its potential role in affecting support 
for same-sex relationship legislation.
Finally, it is clear that the label applied to 
legally recognized same-sex relationships is only 
one factor affecting support. In our data, anti-
gay prejudice accounted for a large portion of 
the variance in support for both same-sex mar-
riage and civil union laws. Importantly, though, 
the effect of the label was independent of anti-
gay prejudice. In other words, the differential 
support for marriages and civil unions was not 
isolated or even exaggerated among the more 
prejudiced participants. This suggests, perhaps, 
that the bias against the marriage label involves 
subtler forms of prejudice that are not tapped by 
the measure of blatant anti-gay prejudice we used. 
Indeed, our results suggest that in addition 
to studying the consequences of negative atti-
tudes toward gay men and lesbians, researchers 
should also attend to the attitudes toward and 
perceptions of heterosexual identity. 
In conclusion, the results of these two experi-
ments contribute to our understanding of why 
heterosexual people tend to favor same-sex civil 
unions over marriages. Consistent with pre-
dictions derived from social identity theory, our 
results suggest that the marriage label itself is 
experienced by heterosexuals as threatening to 
their identity and that this threat may lead to 
decreased support for same-sex marriage laws. 
Public opinion polls fi nd lukewarm support 
for civil unions, suggesting some erosion in the 
perceived legitimacy of existing inequalities 
in rights granted to people of different sexual 
orientations. However, as long as heterosexuals 
as a group remain motivated to protect their 
privileged status, it appears that they prefer to 
address these inequalities by creating separate 
labels to assert the distinctiveness and superiority 
of heterosexuality.
Notes
1. We conducted additional analyses to test 
for mediation by heterosexual threat while 
controlling for the other types of threat. In these 
analyses heterosexual threat still signifi cantly 
predicted support for the law. Consistent with 
the main analysis, a Sobel test for mediation by 
heterosexual threat was marginally signifi cant.
2. Although not a central variable in our analyses, 
we also assessed religious fundamentalism with 
Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s (1992) scale. We 
examined whether experimental condition 
interacted with religious fundamentalism in 
predicting our dependent measures of interest. 
As was the case for our measure of anti-gay 
prejudice, no signifi cant interactions emerged.
3. We conducted additional analyses to test 
for mediation by heterosexual threat while 
controlling for the other threats assessed. 
In analyses controlling for the other threats, 
heterosexual identity threat remained a 
signifi cant predictor of support for the law and a 
Sobel test for mediation by heterosexual threat 
was signifi cant.
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 10(4)
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Appendix
Same-sex marriage law (same-sex 
civil union law)
Imagine that the state legislature has passed a 
new law granting legal recognition of same-sex 
marriages (same-sex civil unions). This same-
sex marriage law (same-sex civil union law) 
will provide to couples in same-sex marriages 
(same-sex civil unions) ALL the rights and 
benefi ts provided to couples in heterosexual 
marriages. Because of the equality provided to 
same-sex couples, this law is considered very 
strong. Please carefully read and consider the 
information below, as you will be asked about 
it in the following pages.
Below are some of the many rights and benefi ts 
provided to same-sex married couples (same-sex 
civil unions) under this new law:
—Filing joint income tax returns to enjoy tax 
benefi ts for married couples (couples). 
—Inheriting from a deceased spouse (partner) 
if he or she lacked a valid will.
—Receiving social security, Medicare and 
disability benefi ts for spouses (partners).
—Receiving veteran’s and military benefi ts for 
spouses (partners), such as those for education, 
medical care, or special loans. 
—Obtaining health insurance and other benefi ts 
through a spouse’s (partner’s) employer. 
—Receiving wages, workers’ compensation, 
and retirement benefi ts for a deceased spouse 
(partner). 
—Taking family leave from work to care for your 
spouse (partner) or a spouse’s (partner’s) child 
during an illness.
—Taking leave from work if your spouse 
(partner) or one of your spouse’s (partner’s) 
close relatives dies.
—The right to visit your spouse (partner) in 
the hospital. 
—Making medical decisions for your spouse 
(partner) if he or she becomes unable to express 
wishes for treatment. Making burial or other 
fi nal arrangements.
—Filing for step-parent adoption of a spouse’s 
(partner’s) children.
—Right for the couple to jointly adopt 
children.
—Protection under existing divorce laws 
regarding the equitable division of property, 
spousal or child support, child custody, and 
child visitation. 
